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I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court jurisprudence concerning the constitutionality of
capital punishment for adolescents is a study in vacillation. In Thompson
v. Oklahoma,1 the Court reversed the death penalty imposed on a
fifteen-year-old.2 It was a five-four decision,3 but only four justices
agreed that fifteen-year-olds, across-the-board, were not mature
enough to warrant execution.4 Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in the
judgment was, however, very narrow. Her concern was that Oklahoma
had not made an explicit policy choice that such minors should be
executed.5 She made quite clear that although “adolescents are
generally less blameworthy than adults who commit similar crimes—it
does not necessarily follow that all fifteen-year-olds are incapable of the
moral culpability that would justify the imposition of capital
punishment.”6
A year later, in Stanford v. Kentucky,7 the Supreme Court upheld
executions of sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds.8 The majority noted that
the common-law rebuttable presumption of infancy theoretically would
have permitted capital punishment to be imposed on those children over
the age of seven who demonstrated sufficient mens rea and moral
culpability.9 Since a majority of states in 1989 authorized capital
punishment for sixteen-year-olds, the majority concluded that there was
no national consensus that executing such minors was inhumane.10
1. 487 U.S. 815. Justice Stevens wrote the plurality opinion which Justices
Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun joined. O’Connor filed an opinion concurring in the
judgment. Justice Scalia filed a dissenting opinion in which Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justice White joined. Justice Kennedy took no part in the decision of the case. Id. at 817.
2. Id. at 838.
3. Id. at 817.
4. Justices Stevens, Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun. Id. at 815.
5. The defendant had become subject to the death penalty simply because he had
been certified as an adult, and in Oklahoma adults were subject to capital punishment.
See id. at 857-58 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
6. Id. at 853.
7. 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
8. Id. at 380.
9. Id. at 368 (“At that time, the common law set the rebuttable presumption of
incapacity to commit any felony at the age of 14, and theoretically permitted capital
punishment to be imposed on anyone over the age of 7.”). The common law also had an
irrebuttable presumption of infancy for children under seven. See 4 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 22-24 (stating that the infancy defense was operative as
early as the reign of Edward III); see also A.W.G. Kean, The History of the Criminal
Liability of Children, 53 L.Q. REV. 364 (1937) (analyzing the antiquity and evolution of
the infancy defense).
10. See id. at 370-71 (“This does not establish the degree of national consensus this
Court has previously thought sufficient to label a particular punishment cruel and
unusual.”).
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In Roper v. Simmons,11 the Supreme Court, again five-four,12 created
an Eighth Amendment categorical bar to execution of persons who
commit capital crimes when they are under the age of eighteen.13 The
decision in Stanford, rejecting the identical claim, was held to be “no
longer controlling on this issue.”14 Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority,
relied heavily on Atkins v. Virginia,15 which prohibited capital punishment
for retarded people.16 He also made clear that the Court had an obligation to
make its “own independent judgment” in determining “whether the
death penalty is . . . disproportionate” and thus violates the Eighth
Amendment.17
Although we recognize that capital cases are often sui generis and may
not be of strong precedential value in other contexts,18 we think that the
11. 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005).
12. Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion in which Justices Stevens, Souter,
Ginsburg, and Breyer joined. Justice Stevens filed a concurring opinion in which Justice
Ginsburg joined. Justice O’Connor filed a dissenting opinion. Justice Scalia filed a
dissenting opinion in which Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas joined. Id. at
1187.
13. Id. at 1200.
14. Id. at 1198 (“To the extent Stanford was based on review of the objective
indicia of consensus that obtained in 1989 . . . it suffices to note that those indicia have
changed.”).
15. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
16. Id. at 321 (citing Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 405 (1986)).
17. See Simmons, 125 S. Ct. at 1192.
18. Nancy J. King, How Different Is Death? Jury Sentencing in Capital and
Non-Capital Cases Compared, 2 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 195, 200 (2004) (“Jury
sentences short of death lack the finality that triggers the Eighth Amendment’s
requirements for guiding jury discretion. . . . The contrast between this affirmative
embrace of inconsistency in non-capital jury sentencing and the condemnation of the
same in capital sentencing is one of the most striking examples of the difference that
death makes.”); see also Jeffrey Abramson, Death-is-Different Jurisprudence and the
Role of the Capital Jury, 2 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 117, 119 (2004) (“[T]he Court has
insisted that a sui generis due process of death is necessary before any particular person
can be picked out to die.”). Compare Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 266, 272, 285
(1980) (holding that life sentence for a recidivist offender convicted of stealing less than
$200 was not barred by the Eighth Amendment and noting that the theme of “the unique
nature of the death penalty for purposes of Eighth Amendment analysis, has been
repeated time and time again in our opinions”), with Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 296-97,
303 (1983) (reversing a sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of parole under a
recidivist statute where defendant had committed seven relatively minor offenses). But see 5
WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 26.1(b), at 1196 (2d ed. 1999)
(noting that while the “extensive and complex” procedures for imposing the death
penalty “are unique to death sentencing, the Court’s efforts to interpret the Constitution’s
safeguards in this context have influenced the development of procedure in other types
of sentencing as well”).
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developmental and psychological distinctions between adults and
adolescents, differences that the Simmons Court believed was constitutionally
relevant regarding execution,19 should also be considered in determining
the extent of punishment for juveniles who commit serious criminal acts.
In particular, we argue that the Court’s recognition of the growth
capacity of juveniles, and their reduced moral culpability, should weigh
heavily in favor of a categorical bar against waiver of children to
criminal court. Furthermore, attempts to circumvent such a ruling by
defining adults as sixteen or seventeen years of age for purposes of the
criminal law should be prohibited.
If these proposals are not accepted, and a child is charged and
convicted of a serious crime in criminal court, the kind and extent of
punishment imposed should be heavily influenced by the type of
evidence relied on by the Simmons Court in finding that youths are not
death eligible. Either the Court should extend the Simmons rationale to
prohibit life imprisonment without the possibility of parole or, at the
least, create a presumption against such a sentence being imposed on an
adolescent. As Justice Kennedy noted, “the punishment of life imprisonment
without the possibility of parole is itself a severe sanction, in particular
for a young person.”20 Even life imprisonment is rapidly becoming life
without possibility of parole. Defendants who use to be paroled in ten or
twenty years are now dying in prison of old age.21
When children kill, as they always have and probably always will, the
state must juggle two distinct and often conflicting concerns: its police
power and its parens patriae interest. These concerns are not, however,
mutually exclusive.22 There is a delicate balance that must be maintained.
19. See Simmons, 125 S. Ct. at 1195 (considering three important differences
between adults and adolescents).
20. Id. at 1196.
21. Adam Liptak, To More Inmates, Life Term Means Dying Behind Bars, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 2, 2005, at A1. The article describes a man who, at fifteen, killed his
girlfriend and was sentenced to life imprisonment. The sentencing judge told the
defendant in open court that if he behaved himself he would be paroled after a few years.
He has spent thirty-five years in prison so far, and was recently denied parole even
though he is a model prisoner and the girl’s family requested his parole. This change is
“driven by tougher laws and political pressure from governors and parole boards.” Id.
22. See Irene Merker Rosenberg, Schall v. Martin: A Child Is a Child Is a Child,
12 AM. J. CRIM. L. 253, 268 (1984) (asserting that in delinquency cases the state has two
interests—the state’s police power and its parens patriae concern and that both interests
were “relied upon in upholding the challenged legislation” which permitted pretrial
detention of juveniles charged with criminal acts); cf. Eric S. Janus, Hendricks and the
Moral Terrain of Police Power Civil Commitment, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 297, 303
(1998) (“The state has a legitimate interest under its parens patriae powers in providing
care to its citizens who are unable because of emotional disorders to care for themselves;
the state also has authority under its police power to protect the community from the
dangerous tendencies of some who are mentally ill.”); Eric S. Janus, Toward a Conceptual
Framework for Assessing Police Power Commitment Legislation: A Critique of Schopp’s
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Even during the more savage common-law era, children’s diminished
responsibility was reflected by the irrebuttable presumption of incapacity
for children under seven, and the rebuttable presumption of incapacity
for those between seven and fourteen.23 But we are not wedded to that
more primitive assessment of culpability. Evolving standards of decency
require that society takes a more refined approach in allocating responsibility
and punishment for juveniles. Clearly, the state must incapacitate and punish
children who commit serious criminal acts, but, as Simmons says, that
does not mean that minors can be executed, nor, as we maintain, be
consigned to a living death behind bars without any hope of respite. As
the Court has said in another context, the legal system must somehow be
adjusted “to account for children’s vulnerability and their needs for
‘concern, . . . sympathy and . . . paternal attention.’”24
II. THE COURT’S OPINION
The facts in Simmons were gruesome.25 The defendant and his two
younger friends broke into the victim’s home. They then tied and
gagged her, drove in her car to a river, and threw her in while she was
still alive. This was planned and premeditated.26 These are the kinds of
facts that usually induce the Court to deny relief,27 and indeed it may
well be that the Court selected this case purposefully, to make it clear
that no matter how heinous the offense, juveniles could not be considered
death eligible.28
and Winick’s Explications of Legal Mental Illness, 76 NEB. L. REV. 1, 8 (1997) (“Police
power and parens patriae considerations are often intertwined in discussions of civil
commitment.”).
23. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 9, at 22-24.
24. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 635 (1979) (plurality opinion) (quoting
McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 550 (1971) (plurality opinion)).
25. See Scott R. Chapman, Juvenile Justice at a Crossroads, W. MASS. L. TRIB.,
Dec. 2004, at 11 (“The facts of the underlying crime are, no doubt, horrific. . . . On its
face, Simmons does not make a good candidate for the rehabilitative model of the
juvenile court.”).
26. For the full recital of facts, see Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1187-88 (2005).
27. See HUGO ADAM BEDAU, DEATH IS DIFFERENT 138-40 (1987) (noting the
generally conservative disposition of the judiciary towards capital cases); see also DAVID
R. DOW, EXECUTED ON A TECHNICALITY: LETHAL INJUSTICE ON AMERICA’S DEATH ROW
xxv-xxvi (2005) (“Judges who want to deny a murderer certain constitutional rights
deploy the facts of the murder as a distraction, as a justification for ignoring the rule of
law.”).
28. See Chapman, supra note 25, at 11 (asking whether the execution of a more
sympathetic teenager would offend our sense of decency, and whether we have “reached
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The impetus for overruling Stanford was clearly Atkins.29 In Penry v.
Lynaugh,30 decided the same day as Stanford,31 the Court held that there
was no national consensus against executing the mentally retarded.32 In
2002, the Atkins Court reconsidered Penry and concluded that evolving
standards of decency required a categorical bar against execution of the
mentally retarded.33 The Court looked to legislation and state practice,34
and concluded that mental retardation “diminishes personal culpability
even if the defendant can distinguish between right and wrong. . . . The
impairments of mentally retarded defendants make it less defensible to
impose the death penalty as retribution for past crimes and less likely
that the death penalty will have a real deterrent effect.”35
Just as in Atkins, the Court in Simmons counted jurisdictions to
determine if there was a national consensus against the death penalty for
juveniles.36 Thirty states prohibited capital punishment for the mentally
the place and time in our society where we need to ‘draw a line in the sand’ sending the
message that age is not relevant when you commit a horrific crime”); see also Carrie
Martin, Spare the Death Penalty, Spoil the Child: How the Execution of Juveniles
Violates the Eighth Amendment’s Ban on Cruel and Unusual Punishment in 2005, 46 S.
TEX. L. REV. 695, 696 (2005) (“Do you believe that a teenager should be eligible for
execution? . . . [I]f the teenager, after a botched robbery attempt, kidnapped a woman,
threw her off a bridge with her hands tied behind her back and watched her drown. . . .
Does your answer change?”).
29. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). After Atkins was decided, a number
of commentators predicted that the juvenile death penalty would be next on the chopping
block. See, e.g., Jamie Hughes, For Mice or Men or Children? Will The Expansion of
the Eighth Amendment in Atkins v. Virginia Force The Supreme Court to Re-Examine
The Minimum Age For The Death Penalty?, 93 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 973, 1007-08
(2003) (stating that the Atkins Court had “redefined the term ‘national consensus’ within
their Eighth Amendment jurisprudence” and that “[w]ith this opinion as precedent, the
Court should examine age-related death penalty legislation and overturn Stanford v.
Kentucky”).
30. 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
31. The cases were decided on June 26, 1989. See id. at 302; Stanford v. Kentucky,
492 U.S. 361, 361 (1989).
32. Penry, 492 U.S. at 334-35 (“[T]here is insufficient evidence of a national
consensus against executing mentally retarded people convicted of capital offenses for us
to conclude that it is categorically prohibited by the Eighth Amendment.”).
33. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321 (“[O]ur ‘evolving standards of decency,’ . . . conclude
that such punishment is excessive and that the Constitution ‘places a substantive
restriction on the State’s power to take the life’ of a mentally retarded offender.”)
(citation omitted).
34. Id. at 313-16 (noting a consistent shift against application of the death penalty
to the mentally retarded and stating “[t]he practice . . . has become truly unusual, and it is
fair to say that a national consensus has developed against it”); see also Roper v.
Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1191 (2005) (referring to the above language in Atkins).
35. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. at 1192 (summarizing the reasoning in Atkins which
assumed that the mentally retarded could not engage in what the Atkins Court called the
“cold calculus that precedes the decision” to murder) (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536
U.S. 304, 319 (2002)).
36. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. at 1192. The Court explicitly noted the parallel to the
methodology employed in Atkins, stating that “[t]he evidence of national consensus

1156

MARRUS.DOC

[VOL. 42: 1151, 2005]

12/22/2005 10:27 AM

Keeping Kids Out of Adult Criminal Court
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

retarded at the time of the Atkins decision37 and the same number
prohibited the death penalty for juveniles at the time of Simmons.38 A
major difference between Stanford, on the one hand, and Simmons and
Atkins, on the other, was that the Court was now counting the states that
rejected the death penalty for all persons.39 Justice Kennedy also stressed
that several states had abolished capital punishment for juveniles in the
interim between Stanford and Simmons,40 that very few states that
permitted the death penalty for juveniles actually executed them,41 that
Congress had excluded juveniles under the Death Penalty Act of 1994,42
and pointed to the practices of other countries and treaties that prohibited
capital punishment for juveniles under eighteen.43 Indeed, the “United
against the death penalty for juveniles is similar, and in some respects parallel, to the
evidence Atkins held sufficient to demonstrate a national consensus against the death
penalty for the mentally retarded.” Id.
37. Id. (“When Atkins was decided, 30 States prohibited the death penalty for the
mentally retarded.”).
38. Id. (asserting that “30 States prohibit the juvenile death penalty”).
39. Of the thirty states Justice Kennedy counted as having abolished the death
penalty for juveniles, twelve did not have any death penalty. Id. Had the Stanford Court
used the Simmons methodology in 1989, it would have counted twenty-five states as
having abolished the death penalty for juveniles (thirteen states had completely abolished
the death penalty and twelve states had abolished it for sixteen- and seventeen-yearolds). Id. at 1208 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 370
(1989) (“Of the 37 states whose laws permit capital punishment, 15 decline to impose it
upon 16-year-old offenders and 12 decline to impose it on 17-year-old offenders.”). The
Court in Atkins only referred to eighteen states as having abolished the death penalty for
mental retardation. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 322 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
40. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. at 1193. Four states and the federal government abandoned
the practice by legislation, one by judicial fiat. Id. at 1211 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
41. The Simmons Court counted six states that had executed juveniles in the
sixteen intervening years between Stanford and Simmons. Id. at 1192. The Court also
noted, anecdotally, that Kentucky had pardoned Kevin Stanford, the offender whose
sentence had been upheld in Stanford. Id. The Court in Simmons cited to Professor
Victor Streib’s research on the subject. Id. at 1192. In addition to the statistics quoted by the
Simmons Court, Streib’s research shows, among other things, that only twenty-two
juvenile offenders had been executed since 1973 (roughly one execution every seventeen
months), whereas at least 922 juvenile executions were recorded between 1642 and 1972
(or about one every four months). These twenty-two post-1972 juvenile offender
executions represented 2.3% of all executions, and two-thirds of them were carried out
by the state of Texas. VICTOR L. STREIB, THE JUVENILE DEATH PENALTY TODAY: DEATH
SENTENCES AND EXECUTIONS FOR JUVENILE CRIMES, JANUARY 1, 1973—DECEMBER 31,
2004 3 (2005), http://www.law.onu.edu/faculty/streib/documents/JuvDeathDec2004.pdf.
Only one of the twenty-two executed offenders had been younger than seventeen at the
time of the crime. Id. at 5.
42. “[N]o person may be sentenced to death who was less than 18 years of age at
the time of the offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 3591 (2000).
43. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. at 1194, 1198-1200.
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States is the only country in the world that continues to give official
sanction to the juvenile death penalty.”44
As the Court has noted, the death penalty is reserved for the worst of
the worst, both in terms of offense and offender.45 Applying that concept,
the Simmons Court noted three major differences between juveniles
under eighteen and adults—immaturity and recklessness,46 susceptibility
to external influences,47 and growth capacity.48 Although the Court
conceded that there might be some adolescents who were as culpable as
adults, it believed that there was “an unacceptable likelihood . . . that the
brutality or cold-blooded nature of any particular crime would overpower
mitigating arguments based on youth.”49 In support of this belief, the
Court cited the prosecutor’s argument to the jury in the case at bar that
the defendant’s youth was aggravating rather than mitigating.50 Thus,
the Court was concerned that the cruelty of a particular murder would
overcome the lesser culpability of an adolescent. This possibility is not
fanciful. In a study, social scientists concluded that “when heinousness
increases, it exerts a more powerful effect than age.”51 Based on these
44. Id. at 1198.
45. See, e.g., Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319 (asserting that capital punishment should be
limited to a narrow category of the most serious crimes and those most deserving of
death due to extreme culpability).
46. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. at 1195 (“‘A lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense
of responsibility are found in youth more often than in adults and are more understandable
among the young. These qualities often result in impetuous and ill-considered actions and
decisions.’”) (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993)); see also Eddings v.
Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115-16 (1982) (holding that the courts must consider all
relevant mitigating factors including age, background, and mental and emotional
development in death penalty cases, and that “minors, especially in their earlier years,
generally are less mature and responsible than adults. . . . minors often lack the
experience, perspective, and judgment expected of adults”).
47. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. at 1195 (“[J]uveniles are more vulnerable or susceptible
to negative influences and outside pressures, including peer pressure.”); see also
Eddings, 455 U.S. at 115 (“[Y]outh is more than a chronological fact. It is a time and
condition of life when a person may be most susceptible to influence and to
psychological damage.”).
48. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. at 1195 (“[T]he character of a juvenile is not as well
formed as that of an adult.”); see also Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 835 (1988)
(plurality opinion) (holding that the execution of a person under 16 years is
unconstitutional and noting that “[i]nexperience, less education, and less intelligence
make the teenager less able to evaluate the consequences of his or her conduct while at
the same time he or she is more apt to be motivated by mere emotion or peer pressure
than is an adult”).
49. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. at 1197.
50. Id. at 1189 ( “In rebuttal, the prosecutor gave the following response: ‘Age, he
says. Think about age. Seventeen years old. Isn’t that scary? Doesn’t that scare you?
Mitigating? Quite the contrary I submit. Quite the contrary.’”).
51. Norma J. Finkel, Prestidigitation, Statistical Magic, and Supreme Court
Numerology in Juvenile Death Penalty Cases, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y. & L. 612, 636
(1995).

1158

MARRUS.DOC

[VOL. 42: 1151, 2005]

12/22/2005 10:27 AM

Keeping Kids Out of Adult Criminal Court
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

considerations, the majority opted for a per se rule rather than a standard
allowing juries to weigh the mitigating and aggravating factors.52
Justice Scalia, joined by then Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Thomas, dissented. He took issue with every aspect of the majority opinion.
In his view, states that had no death penalty were saying nothing special
about executing juveniles.53 He likened the majority’s reliance on scientific
and sociological studies to “look[ing] over the heads of the crowd and
picking out its friends.”54 In other words, there were conflicting studies,55
and in such a situation, he argued, the legislature is best equipped to
52. See generally Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106
HARV. L. REV. 22 (1992) (discussing the differences between interpreting law using a
rule based approach which leaves out subjective factors and a standard based approach
that incorporates various subjective factors).
53. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. at 1219 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[T]hose 12 States
considered none of the factors . . . before us today—lower culpability of the young, inherent
recklessness, lack of capacity for considered judgment, etc.”).
54. Id. at 1222-23 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (applying a metaphor to illustrate the
point that “[e]verything from variations in the survey methodology, such as the choice of
the target population, the sampling design used, the questions asked, and the statistical
analyses used to interpret the data can skew the results”).
55. Id. at 1223 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[T]he American Psychological Association
(APA), which claims in this case that scientific evidence shows persons under 18 lack
the ability to take moral responsibility for their decisions, has previously taken precisely
the opposite position before this very Court. In its brief in Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497
U.S. 417 . . . (1990), the APA found a ‘rich body of research’ showing that juveniles are
mature enough to decide whether to obtain an abortion without parental involvement.”);
see Bruce Ambuel & Julian Rappaport, Developmental Trends in Adolescents’
Psychological and Legal Competence to Consent to Abortion, 16 LAW & HUM. BEHAV.
129, 129-30 (1992) (conducting a study on 75 adolescent women and finding that the
cognition level of adolescents 15 and older were similar to adults). Compare Elizabeth
S. Scott & Thomas Grisso, The Evolution of Adolescence: A Developmental Perspective
On Juvenile Justice Reform, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 137, 159-60, 165 (1997)
(“[S]cientific research and theory support the claim that adolescents are more competent
decision-makers than has been presumed under paternalistic policies, but the scientific
evidence for the claim that their cognitive decision-making capacity is comparable to
that of adults is unclear,” particularly in stressful situations and on “the street . . . . Thus,
adolescents on the street, who are making choices that lead to criminal conduct, may be
less able than adults to consider alternative options that could extricate them from a
precarious situation.”), with Barry C. Feld, Competence, Culpability, and Punishment:
Implications of Atkins for Executing and Sentencing Adolescents, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV.
463, 515-21 (2003) (noting that adolescents are less capable of controlling their
impulsive behavior than adults are because the pre-frontal cortex of the frontal lobe is
not fully developed). During adolescence, the brain goes through a process of
myelination where the brain matter shifts from gray to white. This process starts in the
back of the brain. Therefore, the frontal cortex develops last. During this time,
adolescents rely on the amygdala to make decisions. This part of the brain is the “gut
reaction” part. Therefore, adolescents act on impulse when making decisions. Id.
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decide “which view of science is the right one.”56 The Court’s consideration
of foreign law he asserted, “ought to be rejected out of hand.”57 Perhaps
what disturbed him the most was that the Court used its “own judgment” in
deciding whether the death penalty for adolescents was proportional.58
As always, he yearns for an “originalist” approach to Eighth Amendment
analysis, just as he does in other areas of constitutional law.59
Justice O’Connor dissented in a separate opinion. She agreed with
much of the majority’s reasoning, including the need for the Court to use
its own independent judgment.60 Her concern was application of the
law.61 In her view there was simply insufficient evidence of a national
consensus, unlike the situation in Atkins, and sparse empirical evidence
56. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. at 1223 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (asserting that the courts
may only consider the “limited evidence on the record before them,” whereas the
legislature may “‘evaluate the results of statistical studies in terms of their own local
conditions and with a flexibility of approach that is not available to the courts’”)
(citations omitted).
57. Id. at 1226 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[I]n many significant respects the laws of
most other countries differ from our law—including not only such explicit provisions of
our Constitution as the right to jury trial and grand jury indictment, but even many
interpretations of the Constitution prescribed by this Court itself.”).
58. Id. at 1221-22 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that the rule allowing the Court to
use its own judgment was rejected in Stanford).
59. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 371-72, 378 (1995)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (discussing the originalist approach in an anonymous electioneering
case, stating that “[t]he question posed by the present case is not the easiest sort to
answer for those who adhere to the Court’s (and the society’s) traditional view that the
Constitution bears its original meaning and is unchanging.” He later clarifies the
difficulty of an originalist view by noting “[w]here the meaning of a constitutional text
(such as ‘the freedom of speech’) is unclear, the widespread and long-accepted practices
of the American people are the best indication of what fundamental beliefs it was
intended to enshrine.”); Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV.
849, 852-62 (1989) (discussing the differences between originalism and non-originalism
and stating “I prefer . . . originalism”); see, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110,
127 n.6 (1989) (plurality opinion) (arguing that the most specific, rather than general
historical traditions relating to a person’s rights should be looked at and finding no
constitutional violation when a biological father is denied visitation rights to see his child
when the mother is married to another man at the time of the child’s birth because it is
the marital family, not the “adulterous natural father” that has been traditionally
protected) (no other justice joined Justice Scalia’s conclusion in note 6); see also, e.g.,
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) (holding that the federal government
may not require the state’s executives to conduct background checks on prospective
handgun purchasers under the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act because there is
a lack of historical evidence that the early Congresses commanded the state’s officers to
perform certain functions and therefore the law violates the dual sovereignty that the
Framers of the Constitution designed).
60. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. at 1207 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“[W]e . . . have a
‘constitutional obligation’ to judge for ourselves whether the death penalty is excessive
punishment for a particular offense or class of offenders.”).
61. Id. at 1209 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“[A]lthough the general principles that
guide our Eighth Amendment jurisprudence afford some common ground, I part ways
with the Court in applying them to the case before us.”).
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of the differences between adults and older adolescents.62 She differentiated
the characteristics of mentally retarded persons and adolescents. The
former have an impairment that makes it “highly unlikely”63 they could
be deserving of the death penalty, a status that she thought was different
from chronological age.64
III. IMMATURITY, PEER PRESSURE, AND BRAIN DEVELOPMENT
There has been an angry response to Simmons, at least in certain
quarters. Families of victims were outraged by the decision, arguing that
the Court did not understand the number and dangerousness of violent
teenagers.65 The intensity of anti-Simmons sentiment can also be seen in
the stance taken by some states, at least those in which criminal
defendants are deemed adult at the age of seventeen. The most vociferous
voices were those from Texas, the state which has consistently executed

62. Id. at 1213 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court’s proportionality argument . . . fails
to establish that the differences in maturity between 17-year-olds and young ‘adults’ are
both universal enough and significant enough to justify a bright-line prophylactic rule
against capital punishment of the former”).
63. Id. at 1209 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
64. Id. at 1214 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“[I]t defies common sense to suggest
that 17-year-olds as a class are somehow equivalent to mentally retarded persons with
regard to culpability or susceptibility to deterrence. Seventeen-year-olds may, on
average, be less mature than adults, but that lesser maturity simply cannot be equated
with the major, lifelong impairments suffered by the mentally retarded.”).
65. Among them was Elaine Wild, whose sister was Simmons’s victim. The St.
Louis Post-Dispatch reported the following several months after the Simmons ruling:
She couldn’t believe the verdict. She didn’t buy the underdeveloped brain
defense. “He knew what he was doing the whole time,” she said. In fact,
Simmons had talked about killing someone in the days leading up to the
murder. And the world consensus just didn’t make sense to her. Couldn’t
those justices in Washington understand? He didn’t give Shirley [Crook] a
chance. Why should he get a chance?
March 1, 2005, the day the Supreme Court handed down its ruling, was a day
of tears.
“I don’t know what to do,” Elaine said through big sniffles that day. Every
short phrase was punctuated with a pause to catch her breath. “That was it.
There’s nothing else to do. And it tears my heart out.”
James Carlson, Victim’s Sister Tries to Live On, S T . L OUIS P OST -D ISPATCH , July
24, 2005, at B1; see also Jon Sawyer, Court Bars Juvenile Executions, S T . L OUIS
P OST -D ISPATCH , March 2, 2005, at A1 (quoting a leader of the pro-capital punishment
advocacy group Justice For All).
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more people than any other jurisdiction.66 Texas also housed more
juveniles on death row than any other state.67
After the Simmons decision came down, some judges and prosecutors
in Texas took the position that Simmons was a narrow opinion that
would not apply to the execution of seventeen-year-olds in the state.68
They reasoned that under Texas law seventeen-year-olds are considered
adults for purposes of the criminal law,69 and the state penal code
explicitly allows seventeen-year-olds to be death eligible.70 Evidently
such commentators did not understand that the majority opinion made it
very clear that it was chronological, not legal, age that was relevant.71
The Simmons majority looked at “scientific and sociological studies”72
to establish “that juvenile offenders cannot with reliability be classified
among the worst offenders.”73 The first trait differentiating juveniles from
adults is immaturity and “an underdeveloped sense of responsibility.”74
The Court cited and quoted from an article showing that “adolescents are
overrepresented statistically in virtually every category of reckless
behavior.”75 The states recognize this fact, and limit ages at which
66. See Death Penalty Information Center, Number of Executions by State Since
1976, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid= 8&did=186 (last visited Oct 29,
2005).
67. See STREIB, supra note 41, at 3, 11 (“Almost two-thirds of the current-era
executions of juvenile offenders have occurred in Texas” and between the years 1973
and 2004, “Texas (58 sentences) [was] the clear leader in this practice, followed at quite
a distance by Florida (32 sentences) and then Alabama (25 sentences). These 3 states
together account for over half (115/228) of all juvenile death sentences. Only 7 states
have imposed 10 or more such sentences.”).
68. The Abilene Reporter-News quoted opinions from a local judge and a county
district attorney that the Simmons “ruling doesn’t mean prosecutors will not be allowed
to seek the death penalty for offenders younger than 18 in Texas.” Jason Sheehan, Death
Penalty Ruling to Have Only Limited Effect Here, ABILENE REPORTER-NEWS, Mar. 5,
2005 (Local).
69. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 51.02 (Vernon 2004) (“‘[C]hild’ means a person who
is: (A) ten years of age or older and under 17 years of age.”).
70. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 8.07 (Vernon 2004) (“[N]o person may, in any case,
be punished by death for an offense committed while he was younger than 17 years.”).
71. In addition, Appendix A of the Court’s opinion listed the twenty states that
permitted the death penalty for those under eighteen, and Texas was of course one of
those jurisdictions. The governor of Texas subsequently and reluctantly commuted the
death sentences of the twenty-eight death row inmates affected by the Simmons ruling.
Lisa Falkenberg, Perry Spares Juvenile Killers, HOUSTON CHRON., June 23, 2005, at B1.
The commuted sentence was life imprisonment, which, at the time the minors were
sentenced, was the only alternative to execution. Id. Texas subsequently amended the
penal code to permit life imprisonment without possibility of parole. 2005 TEX. SESS.
LAW SERV. 2707 (West) (to be codified as Tex. Penal Code § 12.31, effective Sept. 1,
2005).
72. Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1195 (2005).
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. (quoting Jeffrey Arnett, Reckless Behavior in Adolescence: A Developmental
Perspective, 12 DEVELOPMENTAL REV. 339 (1992)).
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people can marry, serve on juries, vote, drink alcohol, and contract.76
Juveniles act impulsively, and therefore cannot accurately assess the
consequences of their behavior.77 Impulsivity means that even “good
kids, who know right from wrong sometimes do stupid things.”78 They
engage in unprotected sex which often results in out of wedlock
pregnancies and disease;79 they “do drugs;”80 drink enough to die from
alcohol poisoning, even in college;81 drive recklessly causing their own
death and that of others;82 and are at serious risk of committing suicide.83
76. Id. (“[A]lmost every State prohibits those under 18 years of age from voting,
serving on juries, or marrying without parental consent.”); see also Appendices B, C, and
D of the Court’s opinion illustrating that the majority of states have set the age limit for
voting, serving on a jury, and marrying without parental consent at eighteen. Id. at 120204.
77. See Colin P. Mahon, Balance Between Strictly Obeying Supreme Court
Precedent and Overruling Outmoded Concepts of Capital Punishment, 23 QUINNIPIAC L.
REV. 937, 967-68 (2004) (“[O]ne researcher said that ‘the human brain is not fully
mature before reaching adulthood, and that furthermore the brain regions that are the
most important for regulating impulse control, planning, consideration or consequences,
abstract reasoning and most probably, moral judgment are the very regions that mature
last.’”) (quoting Ruben C. Gur, Declaration of Ruben C. Gur, Ph.D., http://www.
abanet.org/crimjust/juvjus/Gur%20affidavit.pdf); see also Jeffrey Fagan, Atkins, Adolescence,
and the Maturity Heuristic: Rationales for a Categorical Exemption for Juveniles From
Capital Punishment, 33 N.M. L. REV. 207, 207 (2003) (comparing the “limitations in
developmental capacities that characterize mentally retarded defendants” with those that
“characterize a significant proportion of adolescent offenders”).
78. Paul Raeburn, Too Immature for the Death Penalty?, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Oct.
17, 2004, at 26, 29.
79. “Today, nearly 70 percent of all high school seniors engage in sexual
intercourse before graduating, one in eight contracts a sexually transmitted disease
(STD) each year and more than 80 percent of all STD cases occur among those under
29.” Pamela Peeke, Sex & Your Teen; What Parents & Health Care Professionals
Should Know, NAT’L WOMEN’S HEALTH REP., June 2002, at 8. Although teen pregnancy
rates have fallen in the last decade, most of this decrease is a result of increased
contraceptive use. About one third of teen pregnancies end in abortion. Teen Pregnancy,
Abortion Rates Continue Decline, ST. GOV’T NEWS, Apr. 2004, at 10.
80. See Erik Goldman, Teen Drug Use Has Changed Little Since 1970s, FAM.
PRACTICE NEWS, Mar. 15, 2005, at 11 (stating that recreational use of marijuana today is
as common among teens as it was during the height of the drug culture). But see
Michael J. Stoil, Teen Drug Use’s Changing Profile: The Bush Administration Claims a
Victory in Reducing Teen Drug Abuse, But the Data Also Show Some Disturbing Trends,
BEHAV. HEALTH MGMT., May-June 2005, at 9 (reporting a government survey indicating
that past-month illegal drug use among teens had fallen in recent years).
81. An estimated 1400 college students die as a direct or indirect result of alcohol
consumption each year. Robert Davis, Five Binge-Drinking Deaths ‘Just the Tip of the
Iceberg,’ USA TODAY, Oct. 7, 2004, at 11D.
82. “Nationwide, young drivers make up 6 percent of the driving population, yet
are involved in nearly 20 percent of all fatal motor vehicle crashes—about one in five.”
Lisa Rosetta, Utah’s Teen Drivers are Safer than Most, SALT LAKE TRIB., July 1, 2005,
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All parents of teenagers have to contend with the problem of impulsivity
and have greater or lesser success in helping their children to think
before acting. It is true that there are adults who continue to engage in
reckless and impulsive behavior, but this conduct is much more common
in children and much less prevalent in adults.84
The second characteristic the Court focused on in differentiating
juveniles from adults was the effect of outside influences on the
child’s behavior.85 Indeed, adolescence and peer pressure are inextricably
linked—from clothing fads86 to antisocial behavior.87 “To be different”
is to be an outcast and excluded from the “in cliques.” Street gangs,
with their colors and their initiation rites, exemplify the power of peer

at A1. “Adolescent drivers tend to engage in numerous risky behaviors including
speeding which has been found to significantly correlate with a greater risk for
accidents.” Sheila Sarkar & Marie Andreas, Acceptance of and Engagement in Risky
Driving Behaviors by Teenagers, 39 ADOLESCENCE 687, 687-88 (2004).
83. See Richard Fossey & Perry A. Zirkel, Liability for Student Society in the
Wake of Eisel, 10 TEX. WESLYAN L. REV. 403, 403-04 (2004) (“[S]uicide is the second
leading cause of death for teenagers.”). While the suicide mortality rate for youth is
comparable to the population rate, the percentage of youth who attempt suicide is
believed to be considerably greater than the attempt rate for adults. The American
Association of Suicidology (AAS) estimates that for every successful teen suicide
attempt, there are between 100 and 200 abortive attempts and that 8.8% (nearly one in
eleven) high school-aged youth attempted suicide annually. American ASSOCIATION OF
SUICIDOLOGY, YOUTH SUICIDE FACT SHEET (Mar. 19, 2004), http://www.suicidology.org/
associations/1045/files/YouthSuicide.pdf. However, the AAS estimates that the general
population attempts-to-suicides ratio is only twenty-five to one and as low as four to one
for the elderly, with an estimated 790,000 suicide attempts for the general population
in 2002. AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF SUICIDOLOGY, U.S.A. SUICIDE: 2002 OFFICIAL
FINAL DATA, Oct. 16, 2004, available at http://www.suicidology.org/associations/
1045/files/2002FinalData.pdf.
84. Jeffrey Arnett, The Young and the Reckless: Adolescent Reckless Behavior, 4
CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOL. SCI. 67, 67 (1995) (noting that adolescents are more
likely to engage in sensation-seeking, egocentric and aggressive behaviors than are
adults, and that biology and social values conspire to promote reckless behavior among
adolescents).
85. Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1195 (2005).
86. See Michael S. Jellinek, Flexibility Buffers Shock of Teen Fads, PEDIATRIC
NEWS, Nov. 2003, at 16 (arguing that adolescent faddish behavior and teenage
rebelliousness is normal, developmentally-appropriate behavior which helps form a
bridge from childhood to adulthood); see also Michael K. Meyerhoff, The Rule of Uncle
Harry’s Funeral (Dealing with Teenage Fads & Rebellion), PEDIATRICS FOR PARENTS,
Aug. 1997, at 8 (“It is painfully clear that adolescents are characterized more by
impulsiveness, recklessness, and susceptibility to peer pressure than they are by
sensitivity, forethought, and compassion for their families.”).
87. Christopher Slobogin et. al., A Prevention Model of Juvenile Justice: The
Promise of Kansas v. Hendricks for Children, 1999 WIS. L. REV. 185, 198 (“[A]dolescents
are more likely than adults to be influenced by others, both in terms of how they evaluate
their own behavior and in the sense of conforming to what peers are doing.”).
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pressure.88 This susceptibility is magnified by the impulsive behavior of
adolescents.89 For example, when teenagers are invited to play “chicken,”
they will often do it because they want to be part of the group and
because they do not think anything can happen to them.90 Children’s
understanding of death is intellectual, not emotional.91
The most telling and objective difference between adults and
adolescents is in brain development. Abigail Baird, a developmental
neuroscientist at Dartmouth, conducted a study that highlights these
differences.92 In Baird’s study, adults, as well as children aged twelve
through seventeen, were asked to identify emotions on faces in
photographs.93 As they observed the faces their brain functions were
monitored by a MRI scanner that enabled scientists to determine which
parts of the brain were being used.94 When adults viewed the faces, the
amygdala section of the brain activated, alerting the person that the
image was important,95 then the frontal lobe assessed the situation,
checking the person’s memory and other parts of the brain so as to
“coordinate a response.”96 Almost uniformly, adults were able to
identify the emotions being displayed accurately.97 Teenagers, on the
88. Geoffrey P. Hunt & Karen Joe Laidler, Alcohol and Violence in the Lives of
Gang Members, 25 ALCOHOL RES. & HEALTH 66, 67-68 (2001) (discussing gang rituals,
including colors, violence, and “symbolic drinking”).
89. See Slobogin, supra note 87, at 197 (“[A]dolescents tend to focus more on
short-term consequences and less on the long-term impact of a decision or behavior.”).
90. “Often, traffic officers say, crashes happen after teenagers dare each other to
drive as fast as possible. Or they run red lights. They race and play chicken. They sit
on each other’s laps, trying to see how many friends they can jam into one car and block
the driver’s view. Sometimes, they’re drunk or high on drugs.” Kristina Sauerwein,
Teens, Cars Can Be Deadly Mix, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, July 28, 1996, at 1A (noting
further that teens “think they can do anything” and that “nothing will ever happen”).
91. See Linda Goldman, Counseling with Children in Contemporary Society, 26 J.
MENTAL HEALTH COUNSELING 168, 169-71 (2004) (detailing Piaget’s cognitive stages of
development for children and showing that adolescents think about death in logical
terms).
92. Abigail A. Baird et al., Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging of Facial
Affect Recognition in Children and Adolescents, 38 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD & ADOLESCENT
PSYCHIATRY 195 (1999) (scientific journal article describing study); Raeburn, supra note
78, at 26-29 (popular news article reporting on the study).
93. Baird, supra note 92, at 196. There were twelve children in the study, all of them
healthy. The mean age of the sample was 13.9 years. Baird admits the sample is small
and she suggests that further studies using a larger sample be conducted. Id. at 198.
94. Id. at 196-97; Raeburn, supra note 78, at 28.
95. Baird, supra note 92, at 196; Raeburn, supra note 78, at 28.
96. Id.
97. Id.
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other hand, often misidentified the emotions.98 For example, “when
shown a face expressing fear . . . they would identify it as surprise, or even
happiness.”99 In this situation, a teen’s amygdala, the brain’s alarm
system, works properly, but the prefrontal cortex, the brain’s interpreter,
does not.100 “The amygdala zeroed in on the faces as something
important, but the frontal lobes couldn’t focus enough to get the
identification right.”101
The American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry
(AACAP) “determined that the brain does not physically stop maturing
until a person is about 20 years old.”102 Other studies demonstrate “that
the brain continues to develop until the mid-20s, and it does so in an
unexpected way.”103 Gray matter and its connections increase until they
become excessive. The brain then starts trimming the gray matter and its
connections while at the same time reinforcing other connections—
“wrapping them with white matter, a heavier layer of insulation also
known as myelin. This pruning and reinforcement represents the
maturing of the brain. The process continues into the mid-20s.”104 This
means that an adolescent’s personality and character are not static.105 The
98. Baird, supra note 92, at 196; Raeburn, supra note 78, at 28. Baird states “that
the subjects were not able to identify consistently the correct facial expression.” Baird,
supra note 92, at 198.
99. Raeburn, supra note 78, at 28.
100. Baird, supra note 92, at 198; Raeburn, supra note 78, at 28.
101. Raeburn, supra note 78, at 28 (quoting Dr. Baird).
102. Michael Stark, Editorial, A Case for Concern, WASH. POST, June 8, 2003, at
B8. The AACAP later joined in several medical associations’ amicus brief filed in
Roper v. Simmons; the brief stated that “[c]utting-edge brain imaging technology reveals
that regions of the adolescent brain do not reach a fully mature state until after the age of
18.” Brief for the American Medical Association et al. at 2, Roper v. Simmons, 125 S.
Ct. 1183 (2005) (No. 03-633), 2004 WL 1633549.
103. Raeburn, supra note 78, at 26.
104. Id. at 28; see also Abigail A. Baird & Jonathan A. Fugelsang, The Emergence
of Consequential Thought: Evidence From Neuroscience, 359 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS:
BIOLOGICAL SCI. 1797 (2004); Mary Beckman, Crime, Culpability and the Adolescent
Brain, 305 SCI. MAG. 596, 596 (2004); Lee Bowman, New Research Shows Stark
Differences in Teen Brains, SCRIPPS HOWARD NEWS SERVICE, May 11, 2004,
http://www. deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=27&did=1000.
105. Moreover, the process of becoming an adult does not follow a linear trajectory.
Baird and Fugelsang, supra note 104, at 1803, compare the process of adolescent
maturation with the process by which infants learn how to walk:
While an infant is learning to walk, there may be days when they pull
themselves up on the furniture or their parents, they may also balance on their
feet without holding onto anything. As anyone who has witnessed an infant
learning to walk can report, the first few steps are usually followed by a tumble
and sporadic reattempts. They may take their first steps one day, and then not
walk again for several days following this initial foray. We acknowledge that
this process is nonlinear and a result of the interaction of both an immature
brain and lack of experience. Within the developing adolescent, the emergence of
adult levels of reasoning is no different. An adolescent may demonstrate an
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child at sixteen or seventeen is not the adult he or she will be at thirty.
Therefore, punishing adolescents the same as adults is akin to punishing
them for a developmental lag. Furthermore, even though teenagers may
appear to be mature, they are not. “When everything is perfect, they can
act like adults. But you add a little bit of stress, and they can break
down.”106
This maturation process “can be severely retarded by abuse and
neglect—conditions that affect most juvenile offenders on death row.”107
The American Academy of Pediatrics has identified several risk factors
that can incite violence in adolescents, including: exposure to domestic
violence and substance abuse within the home, sexual or physical assault,
and a lack of adult supervision.108 A 1987 study of fourteen juveniles
sentenced to death (which was forty percent of the total number of
juveniles on death row at the time) revealed that nine of them had
“major neuropsychological abnormalities” and seven had psychotic
disorders since early childhood.109 Twelve of the juveniles had been
“brutally, physically abused and five had been sodomized by older male
relatives.”110
adult-like ability to reason abstractly, and act in accordance with this advanced
cognition on Monday, but behave impulsively and irrationally on Thursday.
What these two examples have in common is the idea that the appearance of a
behaviour does not indicate its permanence. Adolescence is an awkward time,
both in terms of movement and thinking, during which the individual becomes
increasingly coordinated.
106. Raeburn, supra note 78, at 29.
107. NATIONAL COALITION TO ABOLISH THE DEATH PENALTY, FACT SHEET: JUVENILE
DEATH PENALTY, http://www.ncadp.org/fact_sheet1.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2005).
108. American Academy of Pediatrics Task Force on Violence, The Role of the
Pediatrician in Youth Violence Prevention in Clinical Practice and at the Community
Level, 103 PEDIATRICS 173, 174 (1999), available at http://aappolicy.aappublications.
org/cgi/reprint/pediatrics;103/1/173.pdf (noting eleven risk factors for adolescent violence
which pediatricians should be aware of); American Bar Association Juvenile Justice
Center, Cruel and Unusual Punishment: The Juvenile Death Penalty—Adolescence,
Brain Development and Legal Culpability, at 3, http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/juvjus/
Adolescence.pdf (2004) (citing policy statement of the American Academy of Pediatrics
Task Force).
109. Dorothy Otnow Lewis et al., Neuropsychiatric, Psychoeducational, and
Family Characteristics of 14 Juveniles Condemned to Death in the United States, 145
AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 584, 584-85 (1988). There were thirty-seven juveniles condemned to
death at the time of Lewis’s study. Id. at 584 (“[W]e welcomed the opportunity to
conduct comprehensive assessments of approximately 40% of the 37 juveniles who are
currently awaiting execution in the United States.”).
110. Id. at 586-87. The authors further noted that the juveniles studied—as well as
their parents and lawyers—were often hesitant to speak about their broken pasts,
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A more recent study examining all the juveniles on death row, and
twenty adolescents who had been executed, came to similar conclusions
noting that “the mitigating factors [of severe abuse] . . . were not presented
at trial.”111 The researcher found that
[o]n average, . . . twenty executed juvenile offenders suffered from five of the
nine traumatic life-determinant factors during childhood, [including] serious
physical and/or sexual abuse; and/or regular abuse of drugs or alcohol from an
early age; and/or historical family abuse of drugs and/or alcohol; and/or mental
illness, brain damage, and mental retardation. . . . Most children and adolescents in
society do not experience even one of these life-determinant traumatic factors.
The correlative effect of these multiple factors is overwhelming. This was the
situation for every juvenile offender, bar one, who has been executed in the
United States since 1973.112

We are not contending that these differences exculpate minors from
punishment. Violent teenagers kill and maim and rape and they must be
stopped. If society permitted victims or victims’ families to deal with
such children, no doubt most people would opt to kill the aggressor.
However, once punishment is taken over by the state, the need for
vengeance must be curtailed. That is why the courts have created
elaborate structures that allow the feelings of retribution to be filtered
through the rational process of measuring culpability. The decision
whether to inflict the death penalty is not solely rational and not solely
irrational; it is an attempt to make a “reasoned moral response” to an
inexcusable, but explainable act.113 If vengeance overrides reason that
fine balance is skewed.
As the law now stands, adolescents cannot be sentenced to death.
They are, however, subject to adult sanctions which are often very
severe. This happens for one of two reasons. One, the state, across the
board, defines adults for all criminal law purposes as sixteen or
seventeen and older. Two, the children who would ordinarily be within
the jurisdiction of the juvenile courts are waived to criminal court to be
tried as adults. Very often the deciding factor for the transfer is the
“systematically conceal[ing] factors in their lives that were most likely to mitigate a
death sentence.” Id. at 588.
111. Chris Mallet, Socio-Historical Analysis of Juvenile Offenders on Death Row,
39 CRIM. L. BULL. 445, 452 (2003). The failure of counsel to find and present such
mitigating evidence raises Sixth Amendment ineffective assistance of counsel issues.
See Ellen Marrus and Irene M. Rosenberg, Roper v. Simmons: Dancing With Death,
CRIM. L. BULL (forthcoming) (claiming that the Simmons categorical bar was in part a
response to the Court’s fuzzy reasonableness standard as set forth in Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)).
112. Id. at 452-53.
113. California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 (1987) (O’Connor, J., concurring)
(“[T]he sentence imposed at the penalty stage should reflect a reasoned moral response
to the defendant’s background, character, and crime rather than mere sympathy or
emotion.”).
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severity of the crime. The lesser culpability of the offender gets lost in
the shuffle. We argue that just as the differences between adolescents
and adults are relevant to capital punishment, they also must be
considered in the decision to transfer and in the legislative determination
that adolescents are adults.
IV. WAIVER—HOW CHILDREN BECOME ADULTS
Kent v. United States,114 the first of the Supreme Court cases
“domesticating” the theretofore unregulated juvenile courts, involved a
judicial waiver law in the District of Columbia.115 The Court held that
the juvenile court judge must hold a hearing and receive evidence
regarding the child’s amenability to treatment as a juvenile offender.116
The importance of the waiver decision is reflected in the Kent opinion.
The Court concluded that determining whether to transfer a juvenile to
criminal court was a “critical stage of the proceedings.”117 Due process
therefore required that there be a hearing, a right to counsel with access
to the probation files, and a statement of reasons for the transfer so as to
permit meaningful appellate review.118
Many states were apprehensive about the injection of due process into
what had been a perfunctory proceeding presided over by a judge whose

114. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
115. If a child sixteen years of age or older is charged with an offense which
would amount to a felony in the case of an adult, or any child charged with an
offense which if committed by an adult is punishable by death or life
imprisonment, the judge may, after full investigation, waive jurisdiction and
order such child held for trial under the regular procedure of the court which
would have jurisdiction of such offense if committed by an adult; or such other
court may exercise the powers conferred upon the juvenile court in this
subchapter in conducting and disposing of such cases.
D.C. Code § 11-1553 (1965) (current version at D.C. Code § 16-2307 (West 2005)).
116. Kent, 383 U.S. at 557.
117. Id. at 553 (“[T]he statute does not permit the Juvenile Court to determine in
isolation and without the participation or any representation of the child the ‘critically
important’ question whether a child will be deprived of the special protections and
provisions of the Juvenile Court Act.”).
118. Id. at 557 (“[A]s a condition to a valid waiver order, petitioner is entitled to a
hearing, including access by his counsel to the social records and probation or similar
reports which presumably are considered by the court, and to a statement of reasons for
the Juvenile Court’s decision. We believe that this result is required by the statute read
in the context of constitutional principles relating to due process and the assistance of
counsel.”).
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discretion was insulated from any challenge.119 It could be argued that
states did not have to create juvenile courts,120 and therefore due process
protection was unnecessary—because if the state had the greater power
to charge all juveniles as adults, presumably the state had the lesser
power to deny juvenile court protection to certain minors.121 This
argument, however, did not obviate the need for due process. While it is
true that the state did not have to create juvenile courts, once it did so,
the decision to deprive certain children of the benefits of those courts
had to comport with due process fundamental fairness.122
Kent prompted states to reexamine their waiver statutes.123 Most
states revised their judicial transfer laws so as to incorporate Kent’s due
process protection in greater or lesser degrees.124 States unhappy with
the Kent ruling enacted statutes to overcome the Kent judicial waiver
requirements.125 In some jurisdictions, prosecutors were empowered by
119. Norman Lefstein, Kent v. United States Supreme Court Juvenile Case, 17 JUV.
CT. JUDGES J. 20, 23 (1967) (“‘Several justices appeared deeply disturbed by the Juvenile
Court’s apparently unlimited power to make the fateful transfer decision from evidence
that the youth and his lawyer had no right to see or dispute.’”) (quoting John P.
MacKenzie, Justices Grapple With Juvenile Case, WASH. POST, Jan. 20, 1966, at A3).
120. See Woodward v. Wainwright, 556 F.2d 781, 785 (5th Cir. 1977) (“[T]reatment
as a juvenile is not an inherent right but one granted by the state legislature, therefore the
legislature may restrict or qualify that right as it sees fit, as long as no arbitrary or
discriminatory classification is involved.”). Irene Merker Rosenberg, Winship Redux:
1970 to 1990, 69 TEX. L. REV. 109, 122 (1990).
121. Cf. Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 205-11 (1977) (holding that since
the state had no obligation to permit manslaughter as an affirmative defense, if it did so,
it could require the defendant to establish that defense by a preponderance of the
evidence).
122. See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357 (1963) (discussing the right to
counsel on a first appeal and stating that “[b]ut where the merits of the one and only
appeal an indigent has as of right are decided without benefit of counsel, we think an
unconstitutional line has been drawn”); Charles L. Merz, Representing the Juvenile
Defendant in Waiver Proceedings, 12 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 424, 429 (1968) (“While at one
time it may have been possible for the juvenile court to waive jurisdiction in a summary
manner, the Kent case has now made it clear that a child is entitled to a fair
determination of the question before jurisdiction may be transferred.”); cf. Evitts v.
Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 400-01 (1985) (“The right to appeal would be unique among state
actions if it could be withdrawn without consideration of applicable due process norms.
For instance, although a State may choose whether it will institute any given welfare
program, it must operate whatever programs it does establish subject to the protections of
the Due Process Clause.”).
123. See Sacha M. Coupet, What to Do with the Sheep in Wolf’s Clothing: The Role
of Rhetoric and Reality about Youth Offenders in the Constructive Dismantling of the
Juvenile Justice System, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1303, 1314 (2000) (“Kent v. United States
began a period of re-analysis of the juvenile justice system . . . .”).
124. See Melissa A. Scott, The “Critically Important” Decision of Waiving Juvenile
Court Jurisdiction: Who Should Decide?, 50 LOY. L. REV. 711, 729 (2004) (“The factors
the Kent Court enumerated are not mandatory, but most states that use judicial waiver
have incorporated the Kent factors into their judicial waiver statute.”).
125. See Ed Kinkeade, Appellate Juvenile Justice in Texas—It’s a Crime! Or
Should Be, 51 BAYLOR L. REV. 17, 34-35 (1999) (“[S]tate legislatures have continued to
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statute to make the transfer decision without any procedural safeguards.126
Such statutes were upheld on the theory that the prosecutor’s determination
was akin to charging decisions over which district attorneys have
almost complete discretion.127 Thus, such laws equated the decision
regarding whether to charge a suspect with a misdemeanor or a felony,
the same as whether to charge a minor in juvenile or adult court. In
either situation, so the courts asserted, the suspect would have a trial at
which he or she could be exonerated.128 However, it is not innocence or
guilt that is relevant in these proceedings. Innocence could also be
established in juvenile court. States with such statutes failed to see that
the charging decision completely determined the sentencing options if
the juvenile was ultimately convicted.129
narrow juvenile court jurisdiction and designate more and more waivable offenses.”); see
also Scott, supra note 124, at 733-34, 736 (asserting that legislative waivers limit or
eliminate the juvenile court jurisdiction by either excluding certain juveniles from the
definition of a juvenile or mandating that juveniles of a certain age who committed a
certain offense are prosecuted as adults and arguing that prosecutional waivers avoid the
juvenile court’s jurisdiction because the district attorney decides whether or not to try the
individual in criminal court without allowing the juvenile a hearing to prove he or she
should not be tried as an adult).
126. See id. at 736 (“The district attorney has the discretion to choose if the juvenile
shall be adjudicated in juvenile court or tried as an adult in criminal court.”).
127. See United States v. Bland, 472 F.2d 1329, 1337 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (concluding
that due process does not require “an adversary hearing before the prosecutor can
exercise his age-old function of deciding what charge to bring against whom”); Scott,
supra note 124, at 736 (“In making this decision, the district attorney is empowered to
exercise his ‘age-old function’ of prosecutorial decision-making.”).
128. Bland, 472 F.2d at 1338 (“It in no manner relieves the Government of its
obligation to prove appellee’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Nor does it remove
appellee’s right to a jury trial.”).
129. See Harris v. Procunier, 498 F.2d 576, 581-82 (9th Cir. 1974), cert denied, 419
U.S. 970 (1974) (Hufstedler, J., dissenting). The court noted that:
[t]he fitness hearing has no direct counterpart in the usual adult criminal
process. The purpose of the proceeding, unlike an indictment or preliminary
hearing, is not to establish probable cause for the initiation of further action.
The hearing is designed to determine, based on an evaluation of the youth, his
background, and his criminal history, the nature of response the state should
make upon a determination of guilt. Thus, to the extent that it can be
analogized to a stage in the criminal prosecution, the fitness hearing most
nearly resembles a sentencing proceeding by the trial judge. . . . By finding that
a youth is not a fit subject for exercise of juvenile court jurisdiction, the court
determines that the accused, if found guilty, will be sentenced as an adult
rather than receive non-punitive rehabilitation pursuant to the options available
to the juvenile court under . . . the [juvenile] [c]ode.
Id.; see also Stacey Sabo, Rights of Passage: An Analysis of Waiver of Juvenile Court
Jurisdiction, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 2425, 2449-50 (1996) (“[U]nder a system of
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Other jurisdictions took a slightly different path, although in essence
one similar to prosecutorial waiver. Some legislatures, instead of explicitly
giving the district attorney the power to waive, wrote the statute defining
a juvenile in such a way as to exclude persons of a certain age who were
charged with certain crimes.130 In those scenarios, at least theoretically,
the district attorney has no discretion and has to file charges in adult
criminal court because the defendant by definition is not a juvenile.131
The determination of what charges should be brought, however, is of
course up to the prosecutor.132 The district attorney could circumvent
the legislative waiver statute simply by charging the minor with a lesser
offense which would keep the youth within the jurisdiction of the
juvenile court. They could also do the converse. Therefore, functionally, in
many states legislative waiver works much the same as prosecutorial
waiver. In neither case is there a judicial proceeding at which relevant
facts are explored by a neutral third party whose decision is subject to
review. This is to be distinguished from statutes which simply declare
that an adult is anyone over the age of sixteen or seventeen. No waiver
is involved in such cases and neither a judge nor a prosecutor can make
such persons a juvenile regardless of the charge.
Every state has some form of waiver. Some states have more than one
type of waiver statute, which gives the prosecutor several options when
deciding whether a juvenile should be tried in adult criminal court.
A. Judicial Waiver
More than forty jurisdictions have enacted judicial waiver laws.133
Typically, the statutes enumerate certain matters the juvenile court judge
is required to consider in making this determination. Generally, these
factors were derived from the Court’s appendix in Kent.134 Kent did not
mandate the use of these considerations, but nevertheless many states

concurrent jurisdiction, deciding how to charge the juvenile allows the prosecutor to
further choose the forum in which to try her.”).
130. See id. at 2443-45 (“Legislative waiver . . . categorically excludes from juvenile
court jurisdiction certain juveniles or offenses. . . . The rationale behind legislative waiver is
simple: charge serious, violent, or persistent juvenile offenders like adult criminals.”).
131. Id.
132. AMERICAN BAR ASS’N, ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION
FUNCTION STANDARDS, standard 3-3.4, 3-3.9 (3d ed. 1993).
133. Wayne A. Logan, Proportionality and Punishment: Imposing Life Without
Parole on Juveniles 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 681, 688 (1998) (“In a three-year period,
between 1992 to 1995, forty jurisdictions enacted or expanded provisions for juvenile
waiver to adult court.”).
134. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 566-67 (1966).
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incorporated them into their own laws.135 The following are the eight
factors listed in Kent: the seriousness of the alleged offense and whether
it was committed in an aggressive, violent or premeditated manner;
whether the alleged offense was against persons or property, with the
weight leaning more toward waiver if it was against a person; the
prosecutorial merit of the complaint; the sophistication, maturity and
prior record of the offender; the need for public safety; and the chance of
rehabilitation of the juvenile through current available treatments.136
These factors are not dissimilar to those considered by juries when
deliberating to determine punishment. The difference is that waiver is
always decided by a single judge.
Some states have incorporated the factors exactly as laid out in the
Kent case. Others have modified or added matters for juvenile court
judges to consider. The additional factors may be whether the alleged
offense was related to gang activity;137 if it was committed on school
property or at any school-related event and whether other students were
put in danger;138 the alleged offender’s relationship to the victim139 and
the impact on him or her;140 the potential for rehabilitation if the
jurisdiction provides parenting or family counseling;141 whether the
juvenile can develop sufficient life skills to become a contributing
member of society;142 whether the child is mentally ill or mentally

135.

Scott, supra note 124, at 729; see PATRICK GRIFFIN ET AL., TRYING JUVENILES
AN ANALYSIS OF STATE TRANSFER PROVISIONS 3 (1998)
(describing state transfer procedures for juveniles).
136. Kent, 383 U.S. at 566-67.
137. The courts will consider whether “the juvenile committed the alleged offense
while participating in, assisting, promoting or furthering the interests of a criminal street
gang, a criminal syndicate or a racketeering enterprise.” ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-327
(1999). Stout v. Commonwealth, 44 S.W.3d 781, 786, 786 n.15 (Ky. Ct. App. 2000) (“[T]he
factor . . . concerning gang participation, was added to the list effective July 15, 1998.”).
138. The courts will consider “[w]hether the alleged offense was committed on
school property, public or private, or at any school-sponsored event, and constituted a
substantial danger to other students.” MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-21-157 (2004).
139. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2152.12(D)(3) (West 2005).
140. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-327(D)(7) (1999); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD.
PROC. § 3-817 (c)(2)(iii) (Lexis Nexis Supp. 1999); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-2-518
(4)(b)(VIII) (West 2005); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6355(a)(4)(iii)(A) (West 2000).
141. D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2307(e)(6) (Lexis Nexis 2001).
142. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 20-508(8)(f) (2004).

AS ADULTS IN CRIMINAL COURT:
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retarded;143 and catchall provisions, in which judges must also consider
any other relevant factors or evidence that bear on the transfer decision.144
The judicial waiver statutes also differ in other ways. Sometimes the
law gives the judges complete discretion to transfer, at least as long as
the evidence supports the decision.145 Other statutes require transfer if a
certain number of factors weigh in favor of it.146 Most mandate that
juveniles be a certain age and be charged with certain offenses before a
judge is allowed to consider transferring a juvenile to adult court.147
Others use presumptions if certain factors are present or weigh specific
factors differently.148 In Florida a child may choose voluntary waiver to
criminal court.149
In addition, the states use a wide age range in their judicial waiver
statutes. The most common age for transfer seems to be fourteen years
old,150 although several states go below that age and permit transfer for
juveniles who are twelve151 or thirteen years old.152 Three states—Texas,
Indiana, and Vermont—allow juveniles who committed offenses when

143. N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-34(1)(c)(4)(c) (Supp. 2005); 42 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 6355(a)(4)(iv) (West 2000).
144. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 571-22(c)(8) (LexisNexis 1993 & Supp 2004);
N.M. STAT. ANN. 1978 § 32A-2-20(C)(8) (West 2004).
145. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-15-34 (d)-(f) (West 2005) (stating that although a
juvenile judge has the discretion whether or not to transfer a child to criminal court, the
judge must consider several factors when making this decision and provide written
findings including probable cause that the allegations are true). But see Barry C. Feld,
The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of the Offense: Legislative Changes in Juvenile
Waiver Statutes, 78 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 471, 491 (1987) (positing that the Kent
guidelines do not really provide objective guidelines for juvenile judges, giving them
unlimited discretion in deciding when to transfer juveniles to criminal court).
146. MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-5-1606(2) (1999).
147. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/5-805 (2)(3) (2005).
148. It is interesting to note, for example, that the Utah judicial waiver statute
initially appears to provide for automatic transfer, however, every juvenile is entitled to a
hearing and it is within the judge’s discretion to keep him or her in juvenile court. See
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3a-602 (2002 & Supp. 2005).
149. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 985.226 (1) (West 2001). Presumably children choose this
option because they believe they would receive a lesser punishment in criminal court.
This can occur if the child is charged with a relatively minor offense. In criminal court
the statutory limits may be quite low. In juvenile court, however, children can be sent to
state training schools for their majority even if the offense is not serious. In In re Gault,
387 U.S. 1, 29 (1967), the offense with which the child was charged would have been
punishable in criminal court by no more than two months in jail or a fine, whereas in
juvenile court he was sentenced to incarceration until the age of majority [twenty-one].
Since Gerald Gault was fifteen, it meant that he received a six year sentence. Id.
150. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1636(a)(2) (2000); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-34
(1)(c)(1) (Supp 2005); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260B.125 (West 2003); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 712A.4(1) (West 2002); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 938.18(1)(a)(1) (West 2000).
151. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-5-1602(1)(b)(ii) (2005).
152. MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-21-151(3) (2004); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-2200 (2004);
705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN 405/5-805(3)(a) (West 1999 & Supp. 2005).
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they were as young as ten to be transferred to adult court under very
limited circumstances.153
Although the judicial waiver hearing is held prior to the determination
of guilt, it is conceptually much like a sentencing hearing.154 In effect,
the juvenile court judge is determining whether the child, if convicted,
should receive a sentence under the juvenile code or under the penal
code. It is the most critical decision facing a child in juvenile court.
B. Prosecutorial Waiver
A few years after the Kent decision, Congress revamped the juvenile
code in the District of Columbia. The code defined juvenile offenders as
those under eighteen except for those sixteen and older who were
charged by the United States Attorney with murder, rape, and other
serious offenses.155 The D.C. Circuit in United States v. Bland 156 upheld
the statute against both due process and equal protection attacks, and
acknowledged that the new law was a response to the “‘substantial
difficulties in transferring juvenile offenders charged with serious felonies
to the jurisdiction of the adult court under present law.’”157 The dissenters
viewed the Kent decision as of constitutional proportions, and therefore
the government was prohibited from creating “a second parallel waiver
procedure” by “definition.”158 Indeed, the dissent argued that “the transfer
of the waiver decision from the neutral judge to the partisan prosecutor
increases rather than diminishes the need for due process protection for
the child.”159
The Bland majority referred to the new code provisions both as a
“legislative exclusion”160 and as an “exercise of prosecutorial discretion.”161
153. T EX . F AM . C ODE A NN . §54.02(j)(2)(a) (Vernon 2002); I ND . C ODE A NN .
§ 31-30-3-4(3) (Lexis Nexis 2003); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 5506(a) (2001).
154. See Harris v. Procunier, 498 F.2d 576, 581 (1974).
155. D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2301 (Lexis Nexis 2001).
156. 472 F.2d 1329 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
157. Id. at 1333 (quoting the reasoning given by the House committee for excluding
those sixteen years and older charged with a serious crime from the Family Division’s
Jurisdiction).
158. Id. at 1340 (Wright, J., dissenting).
159. Id. at 1343 (Wright, J., dissenting).
160. Id. at 1334. The court recognized that jurisdictions have often excluded certain
individuals and crimes from the juvenile justice system. This statute was no different.
161. Id. at 1336. “While there may be circumstances in which courts would be
entitled to review the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, these circumstances would
necessarily include the deliberate presence of such factors as ‘race, religion, or other
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The dissent also viewed the statute in those two ways, although it
emphasized the prosecutorial discretion aspect of the law. The use of
both terms interchangeably reflects the difficulty in distinguishing between
prosecutorial and legislative waivers.
After the Supreme Court denied certiorari in Bland,162 with three
justices dissenting,163 many states followed suit and allowed prosecutors
to file certain cases in either juvenile court or adult court. However,
unlike judicial waiver, a juvenile cannot challenge a direct filing in
criminal court, and there is no requirement of a hearing before such a
decision is made by the prosecutor.164 About fifteen jurisdictions have
procedures whereby prosecuting attorneys can file the indictment or
information directly in adult court.165 Most statutes specify the minimum
ages, in some cases as young as twelve,166 and list the specific charges
that will allow a prosecutor to file adult charges,167 some adding that
the prosecutor can charge the child in adult court only if he or she has
previously been adjudicated a delinquent and committed to a state
institution.168 Therefore, the statutes are substantively limited, for example,
by age, offense, and prior adjudication in juvenile court; however, within
those parameters the prosecutors’ charging decisions are completely
discretionary, unconstrained by procedural due process protections.
Some states have both discretionary and mandatory prosecutorial
waiver depending on the age, crime, and previous history of the
juvenile.169 If a juvenile is of a certain age and charged with any one of
a litany of felonies, such as arson, robbery, or murder, the prosecutor
may file directly in adult court.170 In these states, prosecutors are required
to file charges directly in criminal court when the juvenile is sixteen
or seventeen, currently being charged with specific felonies, and has
arbitrary classification,’ not found in the case at bar.” Id. (quoting Oyler v. Boles, 368
U.S. 448, 456 (1962).
162. 412 U.S. 909 (1973).
163. Justices Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall dissented. Id.
164. HOWARD N. SNYDER ET. AL, JUVENILE TRANSFERS TO CRIMINAL COURT IN THE
1990’S: LESSONS LEARNED FROM FOUR STUDIES, OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND
DELINQUENCY PREVENTION 4 (2000), available at http://www.ojjdp.ncjrs.org/publications/
PubResults.asp.
165. Id. at 48 (Appendix A). Those jurisdictions are Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado,
the District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Montana, Nebraska, Oklahoma, Vermont, Virginia and Wyoming. Id.
166. MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-5-206 (2005).
167. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-501B (2001 & Supp. 2005); MICH. COMP. LAWS
§ 769.1 (Supp. 2005).
168. MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 119 § 54 (West Supp. 2005). In Massachusetts,
direct filing in criminal court may occur if the juvenile is between fourteen and
seventeen.
169. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 985.227 (West Supp. 2005).
170. Id.
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been previously adjudicated delinquent for committing one of several
felonies.171 However, to the extent that the waiver decision depends on
the current charges, the prosecutor is ultimately making the determination
of whether to waive regardless of the statutory wording that filing in
adult court is mandatory.
C. Legislative Waiver
Judicial waiver requires a case by case analysis of each child. Indeed,
most judicial waiver statutes mandate psychological and psychiatric
examinations, and a probation investigation of the child’s home and
background.172 To some extent that may be true with prosecutorial waiver,
that is, presumably conscientious district attorneys weigh all the factors
regarding the child and the crime.173 States, however, do not demand
such individualized determinations by the prosecutor, and their decisions
are not subject to appellate review.174 Legislative waiver, also known as
statutory exclusion, is somewhat different, although, as noted, it is often
difficult to distinguish it from prosecutorial waiver. Indeed, transfer
statutes are almost always categorized as being one of three different
types of waiver. They can, however, be viewed as merely two—judicial
and prosecutorial. For even if the legislature mandates the prosecutor to
file charges against the child in criminal court, the prosecutor is the
official who determines the actual charges.175 Thus, if a prosecutor
decides that a particular child should not be treated in adult court, he or
she may simply bring lesser charges.176 To the extent that prosecutors
171. Id. Juveniles of any age may end up in adult court at the discretion of a
prosecutor if the child is alleged to have committed certain crimes. The Florida statute
also requires that the state attorneys develop written policies and guidelines to determine
when to file charges directly in adult court.
172. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-318(g) (2002 and Supp. 2005); COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 19-2-518(4)(b) (West 2005); HAW. REV. STAT. § 571-22(b) (1993 & Supp. 2004).
173. See Sabo, supra note 129, at 2443 (“[T]he prosecutor may . . . consider such
factors as the dangerousness of the offense, the juvenile’s prior record, her age, and her
amenability to juvenile court treatment.”).
174. See Scott, supra note 124, at 736 (“[J]uveniles who are subject to prosecutorial
waiver are not granted the opportunity to prove to the prosecuting attorney that they
should not be tried as adults. Further, once the district attorney has decided to prosecute
the juvenile as an adult, his decision cannot be challenged or appealed.”).
175. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, supra note 132, at standard 3-3.4, 3-3.9.
176. Juan Alberto Arteaga, Juvenile (In)Justice: Congressional Attempts to Abrogate
the Procedural Rights of Juvenile Defendants, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1051, 1067 (2002)
(“[T]he prosecutor is the one who initially determines whether a juvenile’s alleged crime
is ‘so serious as to warrant transfer or whether . . . the child is amenable to treatment.’
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dislike the judicial waiver process because of its due process formality
and what is viewed as an excess of judicial sympathy, the likelihood is
that prosecutors would lean more toward inflating charges so as to
ensure that the child is tried in criminal court.177
The legislative waiver statutes purport to exclude children of a certain
age charged with certain crimes from juvenile court jurisdiction.178 As
noted above, however, the prosecutor determines the current charges,
and thus can over or under charge the offense. Some statutes require a
child of a certain age to be tried in criminal court if he or she has
previously been adjudicated a delinquent without reference to the current
charges. This is a true legislative waiver statute as there is no room for
prosecutorial discretion. Currently, at least twenty states allow for
legislative waiver. These statutes set the age at which transfer
becomes automatic as early as thirteen 179 and as late as seventeen.180
In Pennsylvania, there is no age minimum; any juvenile charged with
murder or criminal homicide is automatically transferred.181
Jurisdictions with legislative waiver have effectively created an
irrebuttable presumption that children of a certain age who are charged
with certain crimes are not really children.182 Analogously, although not
considered a waiver, statutes that define adults for criminal purposes as
Given the broad discretion already conferred upon prosecutors, one must question
whether a child’s fate should be placed entirely in the hands of a decisionmaker who is
not completely neutral.”).
177. Id. at 1063 (noting the two responsibilities of prosecutors—prosecuting
criminals and shielding juveniles from the penal system). “When asked to weigh one
interest against the other, though, prosecutors generally will assume their role as
advocates of the state and tend to err on the side of protecting society. Once a flawed
decision has been made to transfer a juvenile to criminal court, prosecutors cannot do
justice to their second responsibility, given the harshness and length of the potential
sentences.” Id.
178. See Scott, supra note 124, at 733 (“The legislature generally excludes juveniles
from the jurisdiction of the juvenile court based on their age and offense.”).
179. Mississippi mandates transfer for juveniles as young as thirteen who are
charged with a crime punishable by life or death or for any act attempted or committed
with the use of a deadly weapon. MISS. CODE ANN.§ 43-21-151(1) (2004). Maryland
also requires transfer of a juvenile who is charged with a crime punishable by life
or death, but the minor must be at least fourteen. MD . C ODE A NN ., C TS . & J UD .
P ROC . § 3-8A-03 (Lexis Nexis 2002 & Supp. 2004).
180. Montana, for example, only allows for automatic transfer if a juvenile is
seventeen and is accused of committing one of a long list of offenses, such as rape,
murder, assault on a peace officer, aggravated assault, aggravated burglary or robbery,
possession of dangerous drugs, or the use of threat to coerce criminal street gang
membership. MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-5-206 (2003).
181. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6355 (West 2000).
182. See Sabo, supra note 129, at 2452 (“If the legislature has decided that the
crime with which the juvenile is charged should be tried in criminal court, this waiver
mechanism operates automatically to exclude her from juvenile court jurisdiction, blind
to her best interests and in disregard of any mitigating factors.”).
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persons sixteen or seventeen, raise the same concerns that are presented
in true legislative waiver statutes—an irrebuttable presumption of legal
capacity. Scientific and sociological studies, however, belie that assumption.
At least as measured by brain development, a child is a child is a child
until the age of twenty or twenty-five.
It is our view that courts or legislatures should eliminate waiver of
children under eighteen regardless of the crime or past history. To deal
with the problem of how to treat adolescents nearing eighteen, statutes
could allow juvenile courts to maintain jurisdiction over the child until
age twenty-five. Such an allowance will eliminate arguments that suggest
waiver is necessary because older adolescents could not be treated in the
limited time the juvenile courts have jurisdiction.
If legislatures eschew this approach, a more limited change could be
considered, such as a presumption against waiver regardless of age,
seriousness of crime, and past criminal behavior. Furthermore, the
juvenile courts should be able to consider the kind of evidence that the
Simmons Court relied on to prohibit the execution of adolescents. This
will create little difficulty in the judicial waiver context; the studies
regarding reduced culpability can be admitted into evidence, as well as
testimony from experts regarding the particular child’s developmental
level. The trial court’s decision will then be subject to review on appeal.
The jurisdictions that use prosecutorial waiver will face greater obstacles,
since traditionally the courts generally designate such a decision as
nonreviewable, either substantively183 or procedurally.184 To assure that
evidence of developmental lag, immaturity, recklessness, and lesser
culpability is considered, there must be a list of factors that the district
attorney must consider when making the charging decision and some
form of review of prosecutorial decisions in this context.185 Finally, we
think there should be no automatic legislative waiver. No two children
are the same and should not be treated that way even if they are of the
same age and charged with identical crimes. We also do not believe that
states should define adults as including adolescents under eighteen.
183. Of course, if the district attorney’s charging decision does not meet the
substantive requirements for treating a minor as an adult, for example, age, crime, and
prior offenses, that waiver would be null and void.
184. See Bland v. United States, 412 U.S. 909, 912 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
(“Under the Administrative Procedure Act judicial review of the exercise of executive
discretion is the rule and unreviewability is the exception.”).
185. See Arteaga, supra note 176, at 1067-68 (discussing the need for a check on
prosecutorial waivers).
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V. WHY INFLICTION OF SEVERE CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT OR WAIVER OF
MINORS UNDER EIGHTEEN SHOULD BE PROHIBITED
When a child is subject to waiver of any sort, the prominent factors
determining whether the child is to be treated as an adult or a juvenile
are age, offense, prior adjudications, and, to be frank, the predilections
of the juvenile court judge. Except for the latter, those are the same
factors that the Simmons Court refused to allow a jury to consider in
deciding whether an adolescent should be subjected to capital
punishment. It is true that the Court reached this conclusion in the
context of the death penalty, but conceptually the Court’s rationale
describing the differences between adults and adolescents and its
acceptance of scientific and sociological studies should also apply to
decisions regarding whether juveniles should be considered adults for
other criminal law purposes. If the child’s brain is still growing until
either twenty or twenty-five (depending on what study one uses),
subjecting a child to adult punishment, especially life without possibility
of parole, is irrational. We do not know who that child will be in five
years or ten years. Just as teenagers’ bodies change as they mature, so
do their brains. In effect, waiver constitutes a prediction that the child
is not really a child and cannot be helped within the juvenile court
system. This prediction, however, is based on factors that may well be
different within a few years.
Predicting future criminality is very speculative.186 The studies show
that the measures used to make that determination result in a substantial
inclusion of persons who would not, in fact, engage in the predicted
criminal behavior.187 Although the Supreme Court has concluded that
“there is nothing inherently unattainable about a prediction of future
criminal conduct,”188 it has also acknowledged that “some in the
psychiatric community are of the view that clinical predictions as to
whether a person would or would not commit violent acts in the future
are ‘fundamentally of very low reliability,’”189 and noted studies showing
that “psychiatric predictions of future dangerousness were wrong two
out of three times.”190 Thus, one cannot know with a high degree of
certainty which children will become violent predators.
186. JOHN MONAHAN, U.S. DEP’T. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, THE CLINICAL
PREDICTION OF VIOLENT BEHAVIOR 2-3 (Dep’t Health & Human Services 1981).
187. Jack F. Williams, Process and Prediction: A Return to a Fuzzy Model of
Pretrial Detention, 79 MINN. L. REV. 325, 343-44 (1994).
188. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 278 (1984) (upholding state law allowing for
detention of children charged with delinquency if there was a “serious risk” that the child
would commit a criminal act before returning to court).
189. Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 472 (1981) (citations omitted).
190. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 900 n.7 (1983).
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It is true that the state has a right to punish those who violate the
criminal law, particularly murderers, even if they would not commit
crimes in the future. Retribution has a place in the justification of
punishment. Retribution principles do not, however, tell us with any
specificity how much punishment is necessary for atonement. In Harmelin
v. Michigan,191 the Court, five-four,192 upheld a sentence of life
imprisonment without possibility of parole for possession of cocaine as
applied to a twenty-one-year-old first offender.193 Justices Scalia and
Rehnquist denied that proportionality analysis had any place in
noncapital cases.194 Four dissenters had the opposite view. Justices
Kennedy, O’Connor, and Souter took an intermediate position, requiring
that gross disproportionality had to be established.195 Since the latter is
the narrowest opinion it is the appropriate guide for lower courts.196
Subjecting youths to adult sentences, particularly those which foreclose
any possibility of relief, meets that standard of gross disproportionality,
regardless of the offense the child has committed.
Nor can such disproportionate punishment be justified on deterrence
grounds. As Justice Kennedy noted, “the same characteristics that render
juveniles less culpable than adults suggest as well that juveniles will be
less susceptible to deterrence.”197 Adolescents do not do “cost benefit”

191. 501 U.S. 957 (1991) (plurality opinion).
192. Justice Scalia announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the Court’s
opinion in part IV in which Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O’Connor, Kennedy,
and Souter joined, and with respect to parts I, II, and III, in which Chief Justice
Rehnquist joined. Justice Kennedy filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment in which Justices O’Connor and Souter joined. Justice White filed a
dissenting opinion in which Justices Blackmun and Stevens joined. Justice Marshall
filed a dissenting opinion and Justice Stevens filed a dissenting opinion in which Justice
Blackmun joined. Id. at 957, 996, 1009, 1027.
193. Id. at 994, 1009, 1021.
194. Id. at 957 (“[T]he Eighth Amendment contains no proportionality guarantee.”)
(plurality opinion).
195. Id. at 1005 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“[I]ntrajurisdictional and interjurisdictional
analyses are appropriate only in the rare case in which a threshold comparison of
the crime committed and the sentence imposed leads to an inference of gross
disproportionality.”).
196. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 323, 343-44 (2003) (upholding
racial diversity admissions program and noting that because of the “Court’s splintered
decision in Bakke, Justice Powell’s opinion announcing the judgment of the Court has
served as the touchstone for constitutional analysis of race-conscious admissions
policies”).
197. Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1196 (2005).
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analyses. Bentham notwithstanding, they act impulsively, with little
thought of consequences.198
Determining whether a child should be charged in, or waived to,
criminal court and subjected to severe punishment such as life without
possibility of parole, requires a value choice.199 Concededly, opting to
keep a child within the juvenile court system with its generally lower
sentences risks the possibility of future serious harm to the community.
However, studies show that long prison sentences for children result in a
greater likelihood of recidivism.200
The risks on the other side are very high—the virtual destruction of
young people who might benefit society and live productive lives. Since
we know that mistakes in predicting future criminality will be made, and
that minors have the capacity for growth, which path should we follow?
The Simmons Court suggests that we err on the side of the child.
VI. CONCLUSION
People imagine that children who kill are irredeemable—a “bad seed.”
Both of us have represented children in juvenile court who were charged
with serious criminal acts, including murder. Our experiences tell us
that even children who commit the most heinous offense, such as joining
a group of “friends” to stomp an elderly, defenseless person to death, are
ultimately capable of understanding what they had really done. After
release from incarceration in a secure facility for juveniles, many of
them, although not all, were able to turn their lives around, went to
school, and found jobs. This also happens with adults who are killers.

198. Id. (“‘The likelihood that the teenage offender has made the kind of costbenefit analysis that attaches any weight to the possibility of execution is so remote as to
be virtually nonexistent.’”) (quoting Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 837 (1988)).
199. Id. at 1195-96 (“From a moral standpoint it would be misguided to equate the
failings of a minor with those of an adult, for a greater possibility exists that a minor’s
character deficiencies will be reformed.”). For a detailed analysis of life without
possibility of parole for youthful offenders, see AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH, THE REST OF THEIR LIVES 3 (2005), http://www.amnestyusa.org/
countries/usa/clwop/report.pdf (concluding that although “incarceration may be proper
for youth convicted of very serious crimes such as murder, . . . a sentence of life without
the possibility of parole is never appropriate for youth offenders”); see also Adam
Liptak, Locked Away Forever After Crimes as Teenagers, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2005, at 1
(examining the increase of prisoners who are serving life sentences for crimes committed
as teenagers) and Adam Liptak, Serving Life, With No Chance of Redemption, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 5, 2005, at 1 (describing inmates serving sentences of life without possibility
of parole).
200. IRA M. SCHWARTZ, (IN)JUSTICE FOR JUVENILES 52-53 (1989) (discussing the
drop in juvenile recidivism after Massachusetts instituted state wide reform in the
juvenile justice system by closing state training schools and instituting community based
programs).
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When the Supreme Court invalidated the death penalty in 1972,201 the
sentences of many people on death row were commuted to life
imprisonment. Some of them were paroled and most refrained from
further illegal conduct.202 Admittedly, some did bear the mark of Cain
and went on to kill and kill again. The difficulty is that we do not know
how to differentiate among the different types of murderers. What we
do know, however, is that children and adolescents are growing and
maturing and the chances for them “to make it” are much higher than for
adults.203 Knowing that, we must be very cautious when exposing
children to adult punishment. They are not adults; they are children.
We need to treat them as such.

201. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239-40 (1972).
202. Joan M. Cheever, A Chance Reprieve, and Another Chance at Life, N.Y.
TIMES, June 29, 2002, at A15 (noting that 125 of the 200 people that she interviewed
who had been released on parole after Furman were law-abiding citizens).
203. Franklin E. Zimring, Toward a Jurisprudence of Youth Violence, 24 CRIME &
JUST. 477, 491-92 (1998) (discussing the adolescence stage as a “learning by doing”
stage that involves learning from decisions and mistakes and that adolescent’s lack of
maturity allows for “risk-management strategies” that can be used to reduce the
“consequences from youth crime” that cannot be used on adults).
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